Search docs

Find a documentation page

Bug bounty program

Scope, rewards, and how to report a vulnerability in the TEE-delegated SWQoS marketplace.

The HackerOne program is being provisioned. Until it goes live, send all reports to security@swqos.dev (PGP key fingerprint published on the website footer). All reports receive an acknowledgement within 24 h, business days.

Vendor & launch

FieldValue
VendorHackerOne (alternate: Immunefi)
StatusProvisioning. Launches once the operator account is live
Program URLhttps://hackerone.com/<program-slug> (TBD)
Disclosure policyCoordinated disclosure, 90-day maximum
Safe-harborDMCA + CFAA safe-harbor language, mirrored from the disclose.io standard
Contact (interim)security@swqos.dev

The vendor choice (HackerOne) follows design doc §7.10, chosen for its triage workflow maturity, the existing relationships with infrastructure-tier reporters, and its public disclosure pipeline.

In scope

TargetNotes
Marketplace API (api.swqos.dev and any *.swqos.dev API subdomain)All endpoints under /v1/ and /.well-known/manifest.json.
Marketplace web (app.swqos.dev, in-app /docs)Next.js app + the in-app documentation section.
Host-proxy binaryAll published releases under releases.swqos.dev/host-proxy/.
Nitro Enclave EIFAll published releases under releases.swqos.dev/eif/.
Client SDKsstaked-quic-client-sdk (Rust), TS, Python published artefacts.
Probe servicemarketplace-probe binary, scoring logic, signed JWT issuance.
Settlement workermarketplace-settlement on-chain payment confirmation: memo matching and the RPC two-leg amount validation (validator payout wallet + platform wallet) that gates lease activation.
KMS key-policy templatesThe Terraform module that publishes KMS policies under our control.
Signed manifestsreleases.swqos.dev/manifest.json + revocation.json integrity.

Out of scope

  • Validator-owned AWS accounts (per the shared-responsibility model in threat model. These are the validator's responsibility, not the platform's).
  • Solana protocol-level issues (out of the platform's blast radius).
  • The trader's own wallet, wallet app, or any third-party Solana Pay wallet UI (payment is a single on-chain transaction the trader signs from their wallet; report wallet bugs to the wallet vendor). The marketplace-side logic that builds the transaction and validates the on-chain payment is in scope above.
  • Cloudflare / CloudFront / Fastly issues: report to the respective vendor. We re-mediate via the Terraform module if the issue affects our defaults.
  • Theoretical Nitro Enclave side-channel attacks already documented as accepted residual risk in PRD §9.9 T8.
  • Findings on test, dev, or preview environments (denoted by the staging.swqos.dev or *.vercel.app hostnames). Please report against production targets only.
  • Spam-and-phishing-style social engineering of marketplace staff.
  • Denial-of-service attacks against the production marketplace, CDN, or any validator's TEE. Exercising the rate-limit code paths in good faith with a coordinated test window is fine, but volumetric attacks are not.

Rewards table

Rewards are paid in USDC on Solana. Amounts are in USD-equivalent at report acknowledgement.

Severity (CVSS 3.1)Award (USD-equivalent)Examples
Critical (9.0 - 10.0)$10,000 - $50,000Exfiltration of a validator identity key from the enclave. Remote code execution in host-proxy.
High (7.0 - 8.9)$2,500 - $10,000JWT signature forgery against the marketplace KMS key. Bypass of the fd_keyguard_payload_matches_tls_cv matcher. KMS policy bypass that lets a non-attested enclave decrypt the envelope.
Medium (4.0 - 6.9)$500 - $2,500Persistent XSS on app.swqos.dev. CSRF on a state-changing API endpoint. Rate-limit bypass on JWT issuance.
Low (0.1 - 3.9)$100 - $500Reflected XSS without persistence. Verbose error messages leaking internal IPs. Non-secure cookie flags.
InformationalHall of fame + swagMisconfiguration without exploitability. Outdated dependency without a known CVE path.

Bounty awards are at the discretion of the security team and can be adjusted based on impact, exploit reliability, report quality, and proof-of-concept clarity. Duplicate reports are awarded only for the first eligible submission.

How to report

  1. Encrypt the report with our PGP key (fingerprint published in the website footer once the program launches) and email security@swqos.dev. Or, once the HackerOne program is live, file the report through the HackerOne portal.
  2. Include:
    • A clear, reproducible proof-of-concept.
    • The affected target (one of the in-scope items above).
    • Your CVSS 3.1 assessment of severity.
    • Whether the issue has been publicly disclosed elsewhere.
  3. Wait. Acknowledgement within 24 h business days. Initial triage within 5 business days. Coordinated disclosure timeline agreed within 14 days of acknowledgement.

Safe harbor

We follow the disclose.io safe-harbor language. As long as the reporter:

  • acts in good faith,
  • does not access, modify, or destroy data belonging to others,
  • does not degrade service availability for legitimate users,
  • gives us reasonable time to remediate before public disclosure,

… we will not pursue DMCA, CFAA, or computer-misuse-act claims against the reporter, and we will work with the reporter on coordinated disclosure.

Verifying release artefacts

Every release shipped from releases.swqos.dev/ is built by the GitHub Actions release workflow with SLSA-3 provenance. Reporters investigating supply-chain claims can verify the provenance of any published artefact using slsa-verifier:

# Install the verifier
go install github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/v2/cli/slsa-verifier@latest

# Verify a release artefact + its provenance
slsa-verifier verify-artifact \
  --provenance-path <artefact>.intoto.jsonl \
  --source-uri github.com/nodexpert-labs/swqos-marketplace \
  <artefact>

The --source-uri value is pinned to the platform repository. A verification failure on a published artefact is itself a critical finding, so please report it.

References

  • Threat model: defines the attack surface.
  • PRD §9.9: pre-GA checklist requires a live bug bounty program.
  • Design doc §7.10: vendor choice (HackerOne) and rationale.
  • .github/workflows/release.yml: SLSA-3 provenance workflow.